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The LEGAL SYSTEM'S 
use of 
EPIDEMIOLOGY 
by Arthur H. Bryant and Alexander A. Reinert 
Both law and science are truth-seeking endeavors. In at least one respect, lawyers and sci-
entists are like Agent Mulder on the 
X-Files: we believe that the truth is 
out there and our goal is to find it. 
This article is devoted to exploring 
and improving the means by which 
law relies on scientific disciplines, 
particularly epidemiology, to ascer-
tain the truth. 
While there are obvious differences 
between the processes used to search 
for truth in the scientific and legal 
arenas, the importance of science in 
the law is difficult to overstate. The 
law's interest in and reliance on sci-
ence had been growing since well 
before the U.S. Supreme Court, in 
Brown v. Board of Education (1954), 
made use of social science research to 
reject the notion that racially separate 
education was really equal. Now, in 
courtrooms throughout the country, 
judges and juries look every day at sci-
entific evidence to determine the 
truth (and to decide who wins and 
loses) in a wide array of contexts, 
including toxic tort, employment dis-
crimination, environmental protec-
tion, products liability, civil rights, 
and criminal cases. 
Unfortunately, although science 
and the law have similar truth-seek-
ing goals, our judicial system has suf-
fered from the failure to apply 
accurately scientific knowledge in the 
courtroom. Epidemiology (the 
branch of medicine dealing with the 
incidence and prevalence of disease 
in large populations) is a critical sci-
entific discipline that has been mis-
used by the law in the past 25 years. 
Some of this misuse is not the out-
come of particular legal rulesJudges, 
lawyers, or witnesses who do not ade-
quately understand epidemiology 
simply misapply it. Regretfully, how-
ever, judges and policy makers also 
have established systemic rules that 
give epidemiological studies either 
more or less weight than scientists 
would give them. As a result, the law 
is being taken further from the truth. 
This article reviews six ways in 
which some courts are misusing epi-
demiological studies. These errors 
often preclude courts (and especially 
juries) from considering evidence 
that scientists (and especially epi-
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demiologists) would readily con-
sider. And, perhaps most galling, the 
justification given by judges for pre-
cluding reliance upon this expert 
testimony is that the testimony is not 
really "scientific." On this basis, the 
views of highly-accomplished scien-
tists have been barred from the 
courts.' This article explains and 
offers some reasons for the errors, 
contends that epidemiological stud-
ies should be given the same weight 
and consideration in the legal arena 
that they are given in the scientific 
This article is an abridged version of a presenta-
tion delivered at "From Epidemiology to Policy: A 
Symposium on the Translation of Epidemiologic 
Evidence into Public Health Policy" on July 19, 
1998. The symposium wasjointlysponsored by the 
Center for Epidemiology and Policy and the Risk 
Sciences and Public Policy Institute of Johns Hop-
kins School of Public Health and the American 
College of Preventive Medicine. A version of this 
paper was previously published•in the American 
Journal of Epidemiology. Some citations have 
been updated to reflect legal developments since 
the presentation was delivered and since the 
American Journal of Epidemiology paper was 
published, although not all citations are included 
here. For a copy of the original paper, a copy of 
this article that includes all footnotes, or the 
American Journal of Epidemiology article, please 
contact Arthur Bryant at Trial Lawyers for Public 
Justice, Ordway Building, One Kaiser Plaza, Suite 
275, Oakland, CA 94612-3684. 
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arena, and, finally, suggests several 
ways that epidemiologists, lawyers, 
judges, and other policy makers can 
work together toward this goal. 
Isolated misuse 
Jurors and judges in state and fed-
eral courts increasingly are called 
upon to evaluate the strength of a 
litigant's case based in part upon 
the presentation of epidemiological 
studies. Judges, whether making the 
initial determination of admissibil-
ity or adjudicating post-trial suffi-
ciency of the evidence motions, 
must critically consider the nature 
of the evidence presented, includ-
ing the role that epidemiology plays 
in informing scientific testimony. 
Thus, an initial problem for our jus-
tice system is the lack of scientific 
training of most federal and state 
judges. This lack of training makes 
judges vulnerable to misunder-
standing and manipulation. 
We briefly discuss here some exam-
ples of the difficulty judges have faced 
in correctly understanding concepts 
in epidemiology. Some of the exam-
ples reveal a basic unfamiliarity with 
general scientific principles, but are 
probably harmless. Take, for exam-
ple, courts that have referred to 
"Koch's Postulates" as a means of eval-
uating epidemiological studies. 2 What 
these courts have in mind is not 
Koch's Postulates, but a modified ver-
sion of Hill's suggestions for analyzing 
epidemiological studies.3 Fortunately, 
these courts have been right on the 
fundamentals, because Hill's criteria 
for evaluating epidemiological studies 
are generally accepted in the scien-
tific community, and the error is 
understandable in part, given that the 
first edition of the Federal Judicial 
Center's Reference Manual on Scientific 
Evidence, upon which many courts 
rely, also misidentified Hill's criteria 
as Koch's Postulates.4 
In some cases, however, the mis-
takes made by courts in evaluating 
epidemiologic evidence carry more 
substantive consequences. For exam-
ple, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Fifth Circuit, in Brock v. Merrell Dow 
Pharmaceuticals (1989), considering 
the sufficiency of scientific evidence 
presented in a case involving an alle-
gation that Bendectin caused birth 
defects, illustrated the difficulty some 
courts have understanding the 
proper interpretive weight to give 
confidence intervals. 
First, the court asserted that the 
use of confidence intervals elimi-
nated any need to analyze a particu-
lar study for recall bias or 
confounding. This is plainly false, 
because a confidence interval-
which simply represents the range of 
values that, with a specified degree of 
certainty, is likely to contain the true 
measure of association between the 
disease and the proposed cause-has 
no connection to recall bias or con-
founding. In addition, the court 
stated that if a confidence interval 
included 1.0 in its range of possible 
values, then "no statistically signifi-
cant conclusions could be drawn" 
from a study.5 This treatment of con-
fidence intervals as interchangeable 
with "significance testing"-a propo-
sition for which Brock has been cited 
by numerous courts-is a common 
misunderstanding, and will be dis-
cussed in detail in the section on 
structural misuse of epidemiology. 
Similar examples abound. In a dis-
trict court case, a federal judge 
starkly demonstrated the difficulty 
that some courts have with the basic 
statistical method of hypothesis test-
ing. After noting that accepted p-val-
ues for hypothesis testing included 
"5%" and "l %," the court equated 
those percentiles with the numerical 
values 0.5 and 0.1, respectively, 
instead of the correct values of 0.05 
and 0.01. 6 Due to this IO-fold error, 
the court misapplied its own stan-
dards in evaluating the reliability of 
a particular study of the relationship 
between thyroiditis and low level 
radiation. These examples, in isola-
tion, are of minimal concern com-
pared to the structural problems 
detailed below. Isolated mistakes, 
however, gain power when they are 
translated into general rules of 
application. Courts and commenta-
tors, therefore, should vigilantly 
identify and correct mistakes before 
they are transformed into general 
legal principles. 
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Structural misuse 
More disturbing than isolated mis-
takes is the misuse of epidemiology 
that is certain of repetition because 
of its incorporation into general legal 
rules for evaluation of scientific evi-
dence. Some of these rules have been 
imposed in response to the Supreme 
Court's decision in Daubert v. Merrell 
Dow Pharmaceuticals (1993), interpret-
ing Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and 
abandoning the longstanding Frye 
test of admissibility of expert testi-
mony. While the Frye test focused on 
whether an expert's views were "gen-
erally accepted" in the scientific com-
munity, Daubert ushered in a 
non-exclusive multi-factored inquiry 
into the expert's methodology that 
was thought, at the time, to be more 
flexible in application. Many federal 
courts, however, have applied Daubert 
to restrict scientific testimony in a 
way that profoundly departs from sci-
entific principles. 
This article reviews six specific types 
of structural errors made by courts 
when interpreting epidemiological 
evidence: (1) the insistence by some 
courts that "positive human epidemio-
logical studies are always required" to 
support an opinion that a substance 
causes a particular adverse health out-
come; (2) the conclusion by some 
courts that the absence of any "posi-
tive" epidemiological study trumps 
1. Hall v. Baxter H ealthcare Corp., 947 F. Supp. 
1387 (D. Or. 1996) (excluding testimony of Dr. 
Shanna Swann); Muzzey v. Kerr-McGee Chemical 
Corp. , 921 F. Supp. 511 (N.D. Ill. 1996) (excluding 
testimony of New York University Medical School 
Professor Harry Demopoulos); Wade-Greaux v. 
Whitehall Laboratories, Inc., 874 F. Supp. 1441, 1482 
(D. V.I.) (excluding testimony of Dr. Stuart New-
man, a "highly regarded bench scientist"), aff'd 46 
F.3d 1120 (3d Cir. 1994). 
2. E.g. Berry v. CSX Transportation, Inc., 709 So. 
2d 552, 559 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998). 
3. Hill, The Environment and Disease: Assodation 
or Causation? 58 PROC. R. Soc. MED. 295 (1965). 
4. Bailey, Gordis, & Greene, Reference Guide on 
Epidemiology, in REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC 
EVIDENCE 161 (Washington, DC: Federal Judicial 
Center, 1994). Although the FederalJudicial Cen-
ter's second edition of the Reference Manual on Sd-
entific Evidence corrected this error, some courts 
have repeated the Berry court's mistake. See Miller 
v. Pfizer, Inc., No. 99 Civ. 2326, 2002 WL 221410, at 
*4 (D. Kan. Feb. 7, 2002). 
5. Brock, 874 F.2d at 312. 
6. In re Hanford Nuclear Reservation Litigation, 
No. CY-91-3015-AAM, 1998 WL 775340, at *23 
(E.D. Wash. Aug. 21, 1998), rev 'd on other grounds, 
292 F.3d 1124 (9th Cir. 2002). 
other nonepidemiological evidence 
supporting causation; (3) the decision 
by some courts to prohibit expert tes-
timony in support of causation unless 
it is based on epidemiological studies 
that report a doubling of risk associ-
ated with exposure; (4) the insistence 
by some courts that an expert's views 
can't be considered unless they have 
been published in peer review publi-
cations; (5) the requirement that 
expert testimony be based only on 
studies that meet an arbitrary test of 
"statistical significance"; and (6) the 
exclusion of expert testimony based 
on studies with a confidence interval 
that includes 1.0. 
Some courts exclude expert testi-
mony if it is not based on "positive" 
epidemiological studies. One of the 
most restrictive and scientifically 
inadequate rules adopted by some 
courts is that an expert must rely on 
epidemiological studies in order to 
come to a "scientifically reliable" con-
clusion that a particular exposure 
caused a particular outcome. For 
example, some courts have stated 
arbitrarily that "disinterested and 
impartial experts in teratology" 
require "two high quality epidemio-
logical studies" to conclude that a 
substance is a teratogen (that is, that 
it causes birth abnormalities). 7 Some 
courts have limited this rule to cases 
involving Bendectin, in which the 
7. DePyper v. Navarro, No. 83-303467-NM, 1995 
WL 788828, at *30 (Mich. Cir. Ct. Nov. 27, 1995). 
8. Ealy v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 897 F.2d 11 59 
(D.C. Cir. 1990). 
9. Brock, 874 F.2d at 3 11. 
10. Id. at 313. 
11. Raynor v. Merrell Pharmaceuticals, Inc., I 04 
F.3d 137 1, 1375 (D.C. Cir. 1997). 
12. Meister v. Medical Engi.neering Corp., 267 F.3d 
1123, 11 32 (D.C. Ci r. 2001); Ambrosini v. Labar-
raque, IOI F.3d 129, 138-139 (D.C. Ci r. 1996). 
13. Allison v. McGhan Medical Corp., 184 F.3d 
1300 (I Ith Cir. 1999). 
14. A/kn v. Pennsylvania Engi.nee,ing Corp., 102 
F.3d 194 (5th Cir. 1996); E.l. Du Pont De Nemours 
& Co. v. Castillo, 748 So. 2d 1108 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 2000); Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing 
Co. v. Atterbury, 978 S.W.2d 183 (Tex. Ct. App. 
I 998); Nelson v. American Sterilizer Company, 566 
N.W.2d 671 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997). 
15. Thomas v. HoJJman-LaRoche, Inc., 731 F. 
Supp. 224 (N.D. Miss. 1989). 
16. In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. 
Supp. 1223, 1231 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (Weinstein, 
DJ.) . 
17. Renaud v. Martin Marietta Corp., 749 F. Supp. 
1545, 1554 (D. Colo. 1990). 
18. Renaud v. Martin Marietta Corp., 972 F.2d 
304,308 (10th Cir. 1992) . 
mass of epidemiologic evidence 
reflects no association between the 
drug and the outcome in question.8 
The Fifth Circuit in Brock, for 
instance, noted that because there is 
no consensus that Bendectin is ter-
atogenic, the "most useful and con-
clusive type of evidence in a case such 
as this" rests on epidemiology.9 
According to the court, the lack of 
"statistically significant" epidemiolog-
ical proof that Bendectin causes limb 
reduction defects was "fatal" to the 
plaintiffs' case.'0 While the court was 
careful to say that such proof was not 
necessary in all toxic tort cases, the 
import of the decision is that epi-
demiology is necessary when the only 
other evidence takes the form of ani-
mal studies. For, according to the 
appellate court, a scientist who testi-
fies to an opinion based on in vitro 
and in vivo animal studies uncon-
firmed by epidemiology engages in 
"speculation." Thus, the court held 
that no reasonable jury, based on 
such evidence, could conclude that 
Bendectin caused limb reduction 
defects. 
Arguably, the Bendectin cases 
occupy a special place in causation 
jurisprudence because numerous epi-
demiological studies have failed to 
uncover an association between the 
drug and birth defects. For instance, 
in a Bendectin case, while the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia made the broad assertion 
that the "only way" to extrapolate data 
from animals to humans was to con-
duct human experiments or to use 
epidemiology, it noted that this was 
especially true where sound epidemi-
ological studies support a conclusion 
opposite that of nonepidemiological 
ones.'' 
The D. C. Circuit recently has 
emphasized that the rules it devel-
oped in the Bendectin litigation can 
be limited to those cases and others 
in which there is overwhelming epi-
demiologic evidence against finding 
causation. 12 This position is echoed 
by the Eleventh Circuit. '3 The rules 
announced in the Bendectin litiga-
tion have, however, been influential 
in other toxic tort cases. 14 This is true 
even in cases where, unlike Ben-
dectin, there is simply a Jack of any 
epidemiologic evidence. 
For example, the categorical rule 
from Brock was applied in a suit seek-
ing damages for alleged neurotoxic 
effects of accutane to support the 
proposition that, without some epi-
demiological study or statistical basis, 
an expert's opinion on causation is 
simply conjecture. 15 And a well-
respected federal district court, com-
menting on evidence presented in 
the Agent Orange litigation, 
described epidemiological studies as 
"the only useful studies having any 
bearing on causation. "16 
As if to underscore the point, a dis-
trict court judge in Colorado 
extended the requirement for epi-
demiology one step further, holding 
that, in mass exposure cases, the 
plaintiffs were legally required to sub-
mit epidemiologic evidence. 17 This 
was the judge's position despite the 
fact that the plaintiffs' experts had 
testified that the exposed community 
in this case (where plaintiffs alleged 
contamination of their water supply 
by hydrazines, trichloroethene, and 
n-nitrosodimethylamine) was too 
small to perform an epidemiological 
study. On appeal, the Tenth Circuit 
affirmed the district court's decision 
to grant summary judgment for the 
defendant, but balked at adopting 
the lower court's "dicta" that a sup-
porting epidemiological study was 
required for any mass exposure 
case. 18 
This judicial emphasis on the 
essential role of epidemiology in 
establishing medical causation is not 
reflected in traditional scientific 
prac tice . While epidemiology is rec-
ognized as a powerful and useful tool 
in assessing etiologic relationships, 
many causal associations have been 
established in the absence of epi-
demiological proof. In some of these 
cases, the outcome may be consid-
ered a "signature" of the exposure, 
and pathologic studies, case reports, 
and animal studies were sufficient to 
convince the medical community of a 
causal relationship (e.g., asbestos with 
asbestosis and mesothelioma) . 
Sometimes there is no "signature 
disease," but scientific evidence aside 
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from epidemiology is sufficient to 
convince physicians that a causal rela-
tionship exists. For example, 
asbestos' relationship with lung can-
cer was first noted by leading pathol-
ogists, to be supported by 
epidemiologists about a decade 
later. 19 And the teratogenic effect of 
thalidomide was discovered through 
observant clinicians, not through epi-
demiology.20 Indeed, most teratogens 
"were initially identified in case 
reports and clinical studies[,] . . . 
because teratogenic exposures typi-
cally produce qualitatively distinct 
patterns of congenital anomalies in 
affected children. "21 
Thus, when courts insist that "reli-
able" teratologists will not conclude 
that a particular substance causes 
birth defects without support from 
epidemiology, they speak against the 
weight of history. It is one thing for 
courts to recognize the insight that 
epidemiology offers scientists in 
assessing causation; it is quite 
another to impose criteria that are 
not followed by the medical and sci-
entific community, thereby giving 
epidemiology greater weight in 
assessing legal causation than it is 
given by scientists. 
Some courts insist that nonepi-
demiological evidence should play lit-
tle or no role in an expert's opinion 
regarding causation. A corollary of 
requiring epidemiological studies to 
prove causation is the judicially-
invented rule that, where epidemio-
logical studies are inconclusive, other 
sources of evidence supporting cau-
sation cannot reasonably be relied 
upon by expert witnesses or jurors to 
find causation. Thus, in the presence 
of inconclusive or nonexistent epi-
demiological studies, some courts 
refuse to allow an expert to testify 
solely on the basis of animal studies,22 
and some judges rule that no reason-
able juror could believe that sub-
stance X caused outcome Y in an 
individual, where the expert opinion 
in support of causation is based on 
studies other than epidemiology. 
Some courts may discount animal 
studies because the dosage levels are 
not analogous to human doses.23 Oth-
ers specifically note that expert evi-
dence cannot prove causation wher:i, 
relying on chemical structure activity 
analysis, in vitro studies, and in vivo 
studies, in the face of an "over-
whelming body of contradictory epi-
demiological evidence. "2• Courts will 
fault scientists for relying on such evi-
dence even where a substance has 
been classified as a carcinogen by reg-
ulatory agencies. 25 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
First Circuit limited non-epidemio-
logic evidence more expansively 
when it stated that studies of analo-
gous chemical structures, as well as in 
vivo and in vitro animal studies, "do 
not have the capability of proving cau-
sation in human beings in the 
absence of any confirmatory epidemi-
ological data. "26 Thus, according to 
the First Circuit, even where there is 
no epidemiologic evidence at all, 
other sources of data traditionally 
relied upon by scientists are not reli-
able. This position was echoed by the 
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania when 
it addressed the scientific methodol-
ogy of expert witnesses in Bendectin 
litigation.27 The Pennsylvania court, 
accepting the defendant's argument, 
held that the methodology used to 
assess teratogenicity must rely on epi-
demiology demonstrating a strong 
association, while animal studies and 
chemical analyses could only confirm, 
not prove, a causal association. Other 
courts have taken similar positions.28 
While most of the vitriol directed 
towards non-epidemiological studies 
has been reserved for animal studies, 
clinically-based case studies also have 
been identified as particularly unreli-
able by courts. In a case involving sil-
icone breast implants, a district court 
stated that "case reports and case 
studies are universally regarded as an 
insufficient scientific basis for a con-
clusion regarding causation because 
case reports lack controls .... There-
fore, these cannot be the basis of an 
opinion based on scientific knowl-
edge under Daubert. "29 Many other 
courts have taken similar positions. 30 
Statements like this take no 
account of how there was any under-
standing of cause and effect prior to 
the first large scale epidemiological 
studies of the I 950s. As we have 
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noted, for substances such as asbestos 
or thalidomide, causal associations 
were made in the absence of epi-
demiological studies. All areas of sci-
entific discipline may be relevant to 
etiologic conclusions: clinical obser-
vations, animal studies, toxicologic 
studies, and chemical analysis. In 
some cases, epidemiology is the most 
useful tool for evaluating cause-effect 
relationships, but not in every case. 
Some courts' insistence that epidemi-
ological studies trump other forms of 
scientific evidence is simply contrary 
to scientific practice. 
Some courts prohibit expert testi-
mony in support of causation unless 
it is based upon epidemiological data 
that show a doubling of risk associ-
ated with exposure to the alleged 
cause of disease. The two misuses of 
epidemiology discussed above 
involve courts excluding evidence 
that scientists consider relevant to 
evaluating causal relationships by giv-
ing more weight to epidemiological 
19. Hueper, OCCU PATIONAL TUMORS AND ALLIED 
DISEASES (Springfield, IL: C. C. Thomas, 1942) ; 
Hueper, Cancer in its Relation to Occupation and 
Environment, 25 BULL. AM. Soc. CONTROL CANCER 
63--69 (1943); Doll , Mortality from Lung Cancer in 
Asbestos Workers, 2 BR. J. IND. MED. 81-86 ( 1955). 
20. Sherman & Strauss, Thalidomide: a Twenty-
five Year Perspective, 41 FOOD DRUG COSM. L. j. 
458-466 (1986). 
21. Friedman & Politka, TERATOGENIC EFFECTS 
OF DRUGS: A REsoURCE FOR CLINICtANS vii (Balti-
more, MD:Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000). 
22. See generally Berger, Upsetting the Balance 
Between Adverse Interests: The Impact of the Supreme 
Court's Trilogy on Expert Testimony in Toxic Tort Liti-
gation, 64 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 289, 303--304 
(2001) ( discussing problem with rejecting animal 
studies and over relying on epidemiological stud-
ies). 
23. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals v. Havner, 953 
S.W.2d 706, 729 (Tex. 1997). 
24. Richardson '7y Richardson v. Richardson-Mer-
rell, Inc. , 857 F.2d 823, 830 (D.C. Cir. 1988). 
25. Allen, 102 F.3d at 198. 
26. Lynch v. Merrell-National Laboratories, 830 
F.2d 1190, 1194 (1st Cir. 1987). 
27. Blum v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. , 705 
A.2d 1314 (Pa. 1997). 
28. Siharath v. Sandoz Pharmaceuticals Corp. , 131 
F. Supp. 2d 1347, 1366-1367 (N.D. Ga. 2001) ; 
Castillo, 748 So.2d at 1120; Nelson, 566 N.W.2d at 
674-675. 
29. Wade-Greaux, 874 F. Supp. at 1411. 
30. Siharath, 131 F. Supp. 2d at 1361-1362; Nel-
son v. American Home Products Corp., 92 F. Supp. 2d 
954,969 (W.D. Mo. 2000); Muuey, 921 F. Supp. at 
519; Casey v. Ohio Medical Products, 877 F. Supp. 
1380, 1385 (N.D. Cal. 1995); Atterbury, 978 S.W.2d 
at 199. But see, e.g., Silivanch v. Cekbrity Cruises, Inc., 
171 F. Supp. 2d 241 , 264 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (case 
reports "are plainly relevant to an expert's opin-
ion as to whether a given risk factor is generally 
associated with an injury") . 
studies then do scientists. There is, 
however, another variation on the 
theme. Courts also exclude epidemi-
ologic evidence that scientists value 
by giving some epidemiological stud-
ies less weight than do sci en tis ts. 
Thus, some courts insist that, to be 
heard by a jury, expert opinions must 
be based on epidemiological studies 
that meet artificial, non-scientific 
standards of "scientific validity." Per-
haps the most dangerous of these 
court-created criteria is the require-
ment that any epidemiological study 
relied on to support causation 
demonstrate an association between 
an exposure and disease of more 
than twice the background incidence 
of disease. In essence, these courts 
have conflated the magnitude or 
strength of association revealed in a 
population-based study with the proba-
bility that a substance has caused dis-
ease in a particular individual." By 
imposing this requirement, courts 
appear to have been directly influ-
enced by scientists who resurrected 
the concept of "probability of associa-
tion" in an attempt to rationalize 
compensation for radiation-induced 
cancers.32 The derivation of individ-
ual "probabilities" of causation from 
population-based data has been 
31. E.g. , Magistini v. One H our Martinizing Dry 
Cleaning, 180 F. Supp. 2d 584, 591 (D.NJ. 2002) 
( citing Federal Judicial Center's 2000 Reference 
Guide on Epidemiology for proposition that "the 
threshold for concluding that an agent was more 
likely than not the cause of an individual's disease is 
a relative risk greater than 2.0") ( emphasis in orig-
inal) (internal quotation marks omitted); but see 
e.g., Miller, 2002 WL 22 14 10, al *12 (rejecting as 
"arbitrary" the requirement that relative risk be 
greater than 2.0). 
32. Council on Scientific Affairs, Radioepidemi<>-
logical Tables, 257 J .A.M.A. 806-809 (1987). 
33. Greenland & Robins, Conceptual Problems in 
the Definition and Interpretation of Attributable Frac-
tions, 128AM. J. EP1. 11 85-1197 (1988) . 
34. Kelury v. American Heyer-Schulte Carp., 957 F. 
Supp. 873, 878, 880 (W.D. Tex. 1997). 
35. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 
43 F.3d 1311 , 1321 (9th Cir. 1995). 
36. In re Hanford Nuclear Reservation Litigation, 
1998 WL 775340, al *13, rev'd, 292 F.3d 11 24 (9'" 
Cir. 2002). 
37. Pozefsky v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., No. 92 Civ. 
0314, 2001 WL 967608, *3 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 16, 
200 I ) ; Siharath, 13 l F. Supp. 2d at 1356; In re Breast 
Implant Litigation, 11 F. Supp. 2d 1217, 1225-1 227 
(D. Colo. 1998) . 
38. Grassis v. Johns-Manville Corp., 591 A.2d 671, 
676 (NJ. App. Div. 1991). 
39. Greenland and Robins, supra n. 33, at 1185. 
"Relative risk" is calculated by dividing the inci-
dence rate of an illness or outcome in an exposed 
roundly criticized by e pidemiolo-
gists .33 Yet it retains force in the 
courts, and informs the rule adopted 
by some judges that expert testimony 
is inadmissible unless it relies on an 
epidemiological study with a relative 
risk (or odds ratio) of 2.0 or more. 
Examples of this misapplication of 
probability-based concepts abound in 
toxic to rt cases, from those involving 
intrauterine devices, per chloroethyl-
ene exposure, to silicone breas t 
implants. One court, along wi.th 
imposing this arbitrary requirement 
on a testifying expert, also rejected 
the expert's reliance on a study that 
did find a relative risk higher than 
2.0, because in the court's view, a 
larger sample size was required than 
the 445 women studied.34 
In 1995, a panel of the Ninth Cir-
cuit went perhaps the farthest of 
courts in imposing unscientific stan-
dards on expert evidence, holding 
not just that a witness must rely on an 
epidemiological study with a relative 
risk greater than two, but that a study 
showing less than a relative risk of 
two "may suggest teratogenicity" but 
"actually tends to disprove legal cau-
sation."'" Building on the Ninth Cir-
cuit's statements, a federal district 
court judge held that plaintiffs had to 
population by the incidence rate of that illness or 
outcome in a general or presumably unexposed 
population. For example, if an illness occurs in 5 
out of 1,000 people in the general population but 
20 out of 1,000 in the exposed population, the rel-
ative risk is .02/ .005 = 4.0. A relative risk of 2 
would reflect an exposed incidence rate twice as 
large as a baseline incidence rate. Closely related 
to relative risk is the "attributable risk," which pro-
vides an estimate of the "excess cases" attributable 
to exposure. Attributable risk is calculated by tak-
ing the difference between the incidence rate in 
the exposed group and the incidence rate in an 
unexposed but presumably similar group and 
dividing that difference by the incidence rate in 
the exposed group. In the example given above, 
the attributable risk would be (.02-.005) / .02 = .75. 
That figure implies that three-<juarters of the 
cases in the exposed population are statistically 
attributable to exposure . These are the "excess 
cases," in excess of the number that would be 
expected to occur in the absence of exposure to 
the putative cause. But it is crucial to keep in 
mind two matters: First, these probability analyses 
operate at the population level and do not auto-
matically apply to the individual case; and second, 
even at the population level, these kinds of calcu-
latio ns presume perfect epidemiological studies, 
unrealistically free of bias or error and with per-
fect matching of the exposed and unexposed 
groups on all factors except exposure. Judgment 
is always necessary in assigning weight to epidemi-
ological evidence, whether in science or in law. 
submit epidemiological studies show-
ing a two-fold increase in risk to pro-
ceed in the massive Hanford Nuclear 
Reservation Litigation .36 In 2002, the 
Ninth Circuit reversed the district 
court's decision, cabining its previous 
1995 decision to circumstances 
where there is no o ther evidence to 
support causation other than epi-
demiology. Between 1995 and 2002, 
however, all district courts in the 
Ninth Circuit were required to follow 
the 1995 decision-and making mat-
ters worse, many district courts out-
side of the Ninth Circuit's 
jurisdiction relied on that court's 
1995 decision to impose their own 
similar requirements.37 
In theory, the requirement that 
any epidemiological study presented 
to a jury report a two-fold magnitude 
of association might make sense if 
the plaintiffs rely solely on epidemi-
ology to prove causation. In such a 
case, there would not be sufficient 
evidence to conclude that the speci-
fied exposure more likely than not 
caused the disease in the plaintiff. If, 
however, as is almost always the case, 
the plaintiffs also introduce other evi-
dence to prove causation-such as 
pathology, animal experimentation, 
molecular modeling, or case stud-
ies-then requiring the epidemiolog-
ical studies relied on by the plaintiffs 
to show a relative risk or odds ratio of 
greater than 2.0 is without support. 
An appeals court in New Jersey got it 
right when it stated that this require-
ment "makes little sense, scientifically 
or legally. "36 
There are also more subtle prob-
lems with the thinking evinced by the 
courts above, all of which have been 
astutely observed by epidemiologists. 
To begin with, some studies may only 
measure an increased incidence in 
the subset of cases which would not 
have occurred had there been no 
exposure (excess cases) and may 
ignore other cases in which exposure 
played a role in the e tiology of the 
disease ( etiologic cases). 39 
For instance, if an individual devel-
ops a disease five years earlier than 
she would have had she not been 
exposed to a certain substance, she 
would not be considered an excess 
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case, but she would be considered an 
etiologic case. From the law's per-
spective (and science's) the fraction 
of all etiologic cases attributable to 
exposure is significant, not just the 
fraction of excess cases associated 
with exposure. This is because devel-
oping a serious disease at age 45 
instead of age 50 will likely have an 
impact on overall life expectancy. If a 
court imposes a requirement that an 
injured plaintiff may only recover if 
she can prove that the probability 
that her disease was induced by expo-
sure exceeds 50 percent, use of an 
excess fraction (a fraction that only 
represents the percentage of excess 
cases attributable to exposure) would 
disadvantage the plaintiff. 
Courts often demonstrate their 
failure to understand the significance 
of etiologic cases by focusing only on 
excess cases. For instance , the 
Supreme Court of Texas, in Merrell 
Dow Pharmaceuticals v. Havner (1992), 
stated that "there is a rational basis 
for relating the requirement that 
there be more than a 'doubling of 
the risk' to ... the more likely than 
not burden of proof."40 The court 
hypothesized a population in which a 
condition "naturally" occurs in six 
out of every 1,000 people. Then the 
court imagined that, of 1,000 people 
taking a drug, nine contracted the 
disease. While acknowledging that 
the model is an "oversimplification," 
the court baldly stated that it is not 
"more likely than not" that the drug 
caused any one incidence of disease. 
The Havner court did not even con-
sider the possibility that, while there 
were only three excess cases in the 
population exposed to the hypotheti-
cal drug, the other six cases might 
have developed disease five years ear-
lier because of exposure to the drug. 
The fact that an exposure causes sus-
ceptible individuals to develop dis-
ease earlier than they would have 
absent exposure is both legally and 
medically significant. 
Moreover, courts that insist on a 
two-fold magnitude of association 
between determinant and disease are 
ignoring the difficulty of estimating 
individual risk from population-based 
data. While population-based data 
are useful in evaluating issues of gen- . 
era! causation in a toxic tort case, they 
must be carefully applied to the ques-
tion of specific causation. The basic 
premise of the probability-of-causa-
tion approach-that the population-
based data are precisely replicated in 
each individual-"holds only if the 
individual is truly representative of 
the reference population. "41 The 
analysis assumes, in the absence of 
confounding, selection bias, or mis-
classification, that the background 
rate of disease is the same for all non-
exposed cohort members. 42 Given 
unmeasured genetic and environ-
mental factors, this assumption is 
likely false. 43 The court-created rule 
that any expert testimony offered in 
support of causation be supported by 
an epidemiological study with a 
greater than two-fold magnitude of 
association ignores this reality. 
The reasoning employed by courts 
in arriving at the two-fold risk 
requirement also ignores an impor-
tant complexity of disease process. 
Individuals vary in their response to a 
given disease determinant, depend-
ing on many factors. A substance 
might, for example, have different 
effects depending on the age of the 
exposed individual. Depending on 
how data are stratified, a study that 
reveals no statistical association 
between the exposure and the dis-
ease might misleadingly suggest that 
there is no association, whereas it is 
the complexity of the association that 
is being misassessed. 
Relying solely on the magnitude of 
association to measure the actual 
strength of the studied biological 
relationship overlooks the fact that 
the strength of a factor's effect on a 
population depends on the relative 
prevalence of its causal comple-
ments. 44 Most diseases are thought to 
be caused by multiple unrelated fac-
tors (or component causes), making 
up, for lack of a better analogy, a 
"causal pie." Additionally, there 
might be many different causal pies 
for one disease, each of which, when 
all the component causes are pres-
ent, is sufficient to lead to disease. 
Whatever the biologic significance 
of a particular "cause" of disease, if 
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the other component causes that 
make up the same sufficient causal 
pie are rare, then the magnitude of 
association for the particular "cause" 
will be small. Given this, it is possible 
that over a span of time, the magni-
tude of association between a particu-
lar cause and a particular disease 
"may change because the prevalence 
of its causal complements in various 
mechanisms may also change."45 
There are several examples of 
accepted causal relationships that have 
a relatively weak strength of associa-
tion, such as cigarette smoking and 
cardiovascular disease or passive smok-
ing and lung cancer, demonstrating 
the relative value that strength of asso-
ciation plays in the scientific world.46 
Some courts, however, incorrectly 
assume that a larger magnitude of 
association always indicates a greater 
likelihood of causal relationship-and 
vice versa. This is a drastic and erro-
neous oversimplification. 
Some courts will not admit expert 
testimony if the expert has not pub-
lished her views in a peer-reviewed 
scientific journal. Another prevalent 
legal misuse of epidemiology is the 
insistence by some courts that experts 
cannot testify if their opinions-or 
the epidemiological analyses on 
which they are based-have not been 
subjected to the peer-review process. 
Peer review and publication have 
even been called the "most important 
means of ensuring that an expert's 
methodology is sound."47 
While on its face the peer-review 
requirement may seem reasonable , it 
is not reflective of the scientific 
process of decision making. Publica-
tion in a peer-reviewed journal may 
ensure that a particular study or 
methodology receives attention, but 
40. 953 S.W 2d 706, 717 (Tex. 1997). 
41. Council on Scientific Affairs, supra n. 32, at 
807. 
42. Robins & Greenland, Estimability and Estima-
tion of Expected ¼ars of Life Lost Due to a Hazardous 
Exposure, 10 STAT. MED. 79-93, at 80 (1991). 
43. Id. at 81. 
44. Rothman & Greenland, MODERN EPIDEMIOL-
OGY 10-11 (Philadelphia, PA: Lippincott-Raven, 
1998). 
45. Id. at 11. 
46. Id. at 24. 
47.Jones v. U.S., 933 F. Supp. 894,897 (N.D. Cal. 
1996); see also Havner, 953 S.W.2d at 727. 
it is no guarantee that the study is 
particularly reliable. Nor is the fact 
that an opinion has not been pub-
lished in a peer-reviewed journal evi-
dence that the opinion lacks 
scientific reliability. This is reflected 
in the Supreme Court's opinion in 
Daubert, which noted the fact that 
some well-grounded theories will not 
be published, and some theories or 
techniques will be too new or of too 
limited interest to be published. 48 
In addition, scientists often dis-
agree on the interpretation of each 
other's data. One of the primary pur-
poses for publication is to generate 
debate and discussion in the scien-
tific community. Not all of this debate 
will take place in the pages of peer-
reviewed journals. Epidemiologists 
do not refuse to consider other epi-
demiologists' views simply because 
they are not published in peer-
reviewed journals. Nor should the 
courts. To insist on peer-reviewed pub-
lication of an expert's views before 
allowing a jury to consider the 
expert's testimony is inappropriate 
both because the "actual practice of 
medicine" does not require it and 
because "victims of a new toxic tort 
should not be barred from having 
their day in court simply because the 
medical literature . . . has not yet 
been completed."49 
Some courts require that expert 
testimony be based only on studies 
with results that meet an arbitrary 
test of "statistical significance." 
Another way in which courts misuse 
48. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593. 
49. Tumerv. lowaFireEquip. Co., 229 F.3d 1202, 
1209 (8th Cir. 2000); Heller v. Shaw Indus., Inc., 
167 F.3d 146, 155 (3d Cir. 1999). 
50. Wade-Greaux, 874 F. Supp. at 1452. 
51. Rothman & Greenland, supra n. 44. 
52 Id. at 187. 
53. Magistrini, 180 F. Supp. 2d at 605 n. 25 (stat-
ing that "even if some sciences don't require [a 
specific p-value] this Court does") . 
54. Grant v. Bristol-Meyers Squibb, 97 F. Supp. 2d 
986, 992 (D. Ariz. 2000); Rue-Cured Tobacco Cooper-
ative Stabilization Corp. v. EPA, 4 F. Supp. 2d 435, 
461 (M.D. N.C. 1998) ; LeBlanc v. Merrel/Dow Phar-
maceuticals, Inc., 932 F. Supp. 782, 783 (E.D. La. 
1996). 
55. Havner, 953 S.W.2d at 723. 
56. Rothman & Greenland, supra n. 44, at 190. 
57. Freiman, et al. , The Importance of Beta, the 
Type II Error and Sample Size in the Design and Inter-
pretation of the Randomized Control Trial: Survey of 71 
"Negative" Trials. 299 N. ENGL. J. MED. 690-694 
(1978). 
epidemiology is in their treatment of 
hypothesis testing, which is one way 
for epidemiologists to estimate the 
accuracy of an association between 
exposure and disease revealed in a 
study. Epidemiologists do so by meas-
uring how likely it is that the same 
result would have obtained had there 
been no true association (i.e., if the 
null hypothesis were true). 
The "p-value" is the numerical 
expression of this likelihood. Many 
courts require that a study's results 
have a p-value of less than 0.05 (i.e., 
that there is less than a 5 percent like-
lihood that the study's results would 
have obtained had the null hypothe-
sis been true) before allowing an 
expert to rely on the study for an 
admissible opinion. Misusing the lan-
guage of science, these courts say 
that, because this number must be 
met to ensure "statistical signifi-
cance," studies that fail to meet it sim-
ply cannot be considered. One 
district court described a p-value of 
less than 0.05 as " [ t] he most common 
value used to establish significance 
and to say that an observed associa-
tion is probably real."50 
As epidemiologists know, however, 
0.05 is an arbitrary number, with 
more historical than inferential 
value. 51 The division of study results 
into "significant" and "non-signifi-
cant" serves no purpose in causal 
investigation other than to mislead. 
Rather, use of bright-line rules in the 
context of current scientific and judi-
cial analysis "stems from the apparent 
objectivity and definitiveness of the 
pronouncement of significance" and 
"can serve as a mechanical substitute 
for thought, promulgated by the 
inertia of training and common prac-
tice. "52 The selection of a certain level 
of "significance" at which to test a 
hypothesis involves a balance 
between the number of false positives 
and false negatives considered 
acceptable. Using a higher p-value 
(say, 0.10) will increase the number 
of false positives, but decrease the 
number of false negatives (although 
there is not a one-to-one relationship 
between the two). There is no 
absolutely correct p-value from which 
to choose, but judges are prone to 
use 0.05 simply because they are told 
that this is the standard for "statistical 
significance." Indeed, some judges, 
with the knowledge that overreliance 
upon tests of statistical significance 
has been criticized by scientists them-
selves, insist that " [ t] here must be 
some objective way to put a value on 
what the study says or shows."53 If sci-
entists and courts insist on "signifi-
cance" testing, the actual p-value 
should be reported and considered, 
not simply whether it falls above or 
below an arbitrary point. 
Some courts misunderstand the 
utility of a study's confidence interval 
and exclude expert testimony based 
on studies with an interval that 
includes 1.0. Finally, some courts 
state as a matter of law that if a confi-
dence interval (usually performed at 
the 95 percent level) includes the 
value 1.0, then the study is not "statis-
tically significant," and therefore is 
not reliable. Many courts that take 
this position cite the Fifth Circuit's 
decision in Brock as support.5' The 
imposition of this legal requirement 
flows from a misunderstanding of the 
basic reason for using confidence 
intervals. The Havner court stated 
that a confidence interval "tells us if 
the results of a given study are statis-
tically significant at a particular con-
fidence leveJ."55 According to the 
court, if the confidence interval 
includes the number 1.0, then it is 
not statistically significant, and hence 
inconclusive. 
This equivalence of the confidence 
interval with hypothesis testing is pre-
cisely contrary to the purpose of pro-
viding a confidence interval. The 
confidence interval is intended to 
provide a range of values within 
which, at a specified level of certainty, 
the magnitude of association lies.56 
The confidence interval is not 
another way to conduct hypothesis 
testing. This point was brought home 
by a reanalysis of 71 clinical trials that 
relied on hypothesis testing to con-
clude that there was no relationship 
between a proposed treatment and a 
disease response, while the use of 
confidence intervals revealed a mod-
erate to strong effect of the treatment 
being tested.57 
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A study in which the 95 percent 
confidence interval includes the 
value 1.0 (i. e., a relative risk in which 
the incidence of disease is no greater 
in those exposed to the putative 
cause than in those unexposed) may 
be statistically compatible with no 
association, but could be overwhelm-
ingly compatible with a strong associ-
ation. Imagine two different studies. 
One finds a relative risk of 1.8, with a 
95 percent confidence interval 
between 1.05 and 3.08. Another finds 
a relative risk of 3.4, with a 95 percent 
confidence interval between 0.95 and 
12.17. It is true that, of these two 
studies, it is less likely that the magni-
tude of association observed in the 
first would have been observed had 
there been no causal relationship 
between the disease and the pro-
posed causal factor. This does not 
mean, however, that the observations 
of the second study ( or, for that mat-
ter, the first) offer no support for the 
proposition that there is a causal rela-
tionship present. Simply put, when 
judges only use confidence intervals 
to determine whether 1.0 lies inside 
or outside the interval, they are act-
ing contrary to the scientific process 
by abandoning the inferential value 
of the confidence interval. 
Results of misuse 
Theoretically, one might look at the 
examples of misuse described above 
and conclude that, while unfortu-
nate, disparate treatment of epidemi-
ology in the scientific and legal 
arenas should not raise the hackles of 
judges, lawyers, scientists, or policy 
makers. In reality, however, the barri-
ers that judges have created to limit 
the admissibility of expert testimony 
have profound, one-sided conse-
quences. In the short-term, the struc-
tural limitations on admissible 
evidence mostly function to disfavor 
plaintiffs seeking compensation for 
injuries and assist companies seeking 
to avoid liability (although there will 
be some instances in which corporate 
defendants will be disadvantaged by 
these rules). In the long run, they 
ensure that our system of justice will 
be increasingly divorced from the 
truth-and that there will be a declin-
ing respect for both science and law. 
The short-term harm to plaintiffs is 
due to several factors. First, plaintiffs 
carry the burden of proof in civil 
cases, and must show that a defen-
dant's product or conduct caused 
their injury by a preponderance of 
the evidence. The rules described 
above make proving causation more 
difficult. This effect might be miti-
gated somewhat if the rules were 
accompanied by their mirror images. 
In other words, if an epidemiological 
study reporting a relative risk of 
greater than 2.0 was not only neces-
sary to support expert testimony on 
causation, but sufficient to prove cau-
sation, then the rule, though still irra-
tional, would have a less inequitable 
effect. We do not suggest, however, 
that courts adopt such a rule . 
By requiring the presentation of 
epidemiological data to support testi-
mony on causation, courts also effec-
tively disfavor injured plaintiffs 
because of unequal access to 
resources. Injured plaintiffs normally 
do not have sufficient funds to sup-
port epidemiologic research related 
to their legal claims, and federal 
funding of large-scale epidemiologi-
cal studies has decreased along with 
funding of scientific research in gen-
eral. In contrast, most defendants in 
mass toxic tort cases have sufficient 
funds to choose which relationships 
to study, how to study them, and 
whether to publicize the results. 
Some courts have recognized this 
problem.58 
Finally, there are short-term effects 
on injured plaintiffs because of the 
varying interests of repeat and non-
repeat players in the justice system. 
Most plaintiffs have no interest in 
funding a long-term epidemiological 
study that may have no impact on 
their particular case, or may take too 
long to have an impact. Corpora-
tions, with the expectation of being 
sued multiple times, have a greater 
incentive to fund epidemiological 
studies, and to publish those that are 
favorable to their defense. 
The long-term effect of the mis-
guided restrictions on evidence 
described in this article is simple. As 
more and more relevant evidence is 
20 JUDICATURE Volume 87, Number 1 July-August 2003 
excluded, the outcomes in court 
cases will become less and less consis-
tent with the truth . This, we fear, will 
concomitantly lead to decreased 
respect by the public for science and 
for the law. 
Causes of legal misuse 
In our view, there are several reasons 
why the law continues to misuse epi-
demiology. First, some of the misuse 
stems from the unfamiliarity of many 
judges with the scientific process. 
Miscommunication and misunder-
standing inevitably lead to misuse. 
A second explanation is the desire 
of judges to impose bright-line rules, 
such as requiring an epidemiological 
study to demonstrate a two-fold mag-
nitude of association, a p-value of less 
than 0.05, or a confidence interval 
that does not include unity. Judges, 
seeking certainty where scientists are 
unwilling to impose it, may apply 
these rules to make decisions easier, 
and give an air of scientific "objectiv-
ity" to their rulings. 
Third, there may be a fear ( explic-
itly articulated in some of the Ben-
dectin cases) that ''.junk science," in 
combination with dramatic testimony 
from injured plaintiffs, will work a 
pernicious influence on gullible 
juries. If this fear is truly justified, 
however, then the jury system should 
be improved. The evidentiary rules 
should not be rigged so that scientific 
studies are given more or less weight 
in the courtroom than scientists 
would give them, depending upon 
what is necessary to keep the case 
from the jury. 
A fourth factor contributing to 
legal misuse of epidemiology is a 
combination of judicial hubris and 
susceptibility.Judges are called upon, 
every day, to master unfamiliar sub-
jects and to make major decisions 
affecting others' lives. They do so, 
moreover, in an adversarial context, 
where they are understandably suspi-
cious of all of the participants' 
motives. Ultimately, even without any 
scientific training, some judges come 
58. Bonner v. ISP Technologies, Inc., 259 F.3d 924, 
928-930 (8th Cir. 2001 ); Mar<kr, 630 F. Supp. at 
1094. 
to believe that they are better 
equipped than scientists ( or at least 
the scientists before them) to deter-
mine what is and is not valid scientific 
methodology. 
An even more basic reason these 
rules have been adopted is that their 
substantive results are desired by 
those who benefit from them the 
most-potential corporate defen-
dants seeking to minimize their lia-
bility and maximize their profits. In 
saying this, we are not ascribing any 
pernicious motives to these compa-
nies. They are doing exactly what one 
would expect profit-maximizing insti-
tutions in our economy to do-trying 
to get the legal rules (and judges' 
interpretations of them) changed to 
their benefit. While demonstrating 
this fact is well beyond the scope of 
this article, we will provide one anec-
dote that reflects the means by which 
some companies, and their support-
ers, further their goals. 
Recently, America's largest corpo-
rations helped launch a massive cam-
paign to convince policy makers that 
''.junk science" was an enormous 
threat to our system of justice-and 
that the legal rules had to be changed 
to prevent it. The centerpiece of the 
campaign was a book written by Peter 
Huber, detailing fantastical claims of 
the willingness of judges and juries to 
rely on the "far fringes of science" to 
assess liability. 59 Huber described 
juries (and some judges) running 
amok, awarding damages to plaintiffs 
who brought "frivolous" claims based 
on questionable scientific evidence. 
The book was cited by several courts, 
including the Ninth Circuit in its 
Daubert decision, and undoubtedly 
played a key role in persuading some 
judges that changes in the legal rules 
governing the admissibility of scien-
tific evidence were needed. Much of 
Huber's book, however, was blatantly 
unreliable. 60 Huber's ideas appear to 
59. Huber, GALILEO'S REVENCE:JUNK SCIENCE IN 
THE COURTROOM (New York, NY: Basic Books, 
1991). 
60. Chesebro, Galileo's &tort: Peter Huber 's junk 
Scholarship, 42 AM. U. L. REv. 1637-1726 (1993). 
61. Id. at 1707-1722. 
62. Information about the Association's project 
can be found at http://www.aaas.org/ spp/ case/ 
case. 
have gained success primarily due to 
the efforts of the Manhattan Institute 
for Policy Research, a conservative 
think tank, to promote the ideas of 
people like Huber and others who 
would raise barriers to a plaintiffs 
ability to successfully bring suit 
against a corporation.61 
Suggestions for action 
We propose several possible ways to 
improve the law's use of science in 
evaluating causal relationships. First, 
to the extent that legal misuse of epi-
demiology is caused by misunder-
standing or miscommunication, both 
the scientific and legal communities 
have to do more to educate judges 
about science. Second, there are pro-
cedures for judges to appoint experts 
for the court, not to take sides, but, 
rather, to ensure that the judge, and 
in some cases the jury, understands 
the relevant scientific principles in a 
case. The American Association for 
the Advancement of Sciences has 
launched a program to help federal 
judges identify potentially-helpful 
court-appointed experts-it became 
fully operational two years ago and 
since that time has assisted federal 
judges in identifying experts in fields 
ranging from engineering to econo-
metrics to epidemiology. 62 
Third, the scientific community 
needs to provide feedback to the 
legal community in general, and 
judges in particular, about whether 
science is being used correctly. The 
simplest way for scientists to do this is 
to inform judges and litigants directly 
when they learn of a lawsuit or legal 
decision in which science is being 
misused. Scientists also should pub-
lish articles, in legal as well as scien-
tific media, expressing their concerns 
and correcting the errors they have 
found. In our experience, most 
judges are surprisingly responsive to 
this feedback; they want to use sci-
ence correctly. The most formal, and 
most effective, means to provide such 
feedback is for scientists to file amicus 
curiae briefs. Amicus briefs, filed 
either while a decision is under 
reconsideration or in advance of an 
appellate argument regarding an 
important scientific question, are 
essential for informing judges how to 
use scientific principles correctly. 
Scientific organizations and educa-
tional institutions also should pro-
mote educational programs to bring 
scientists, lawyers, and judges 
together. Many judges are particu-
larly eager to learn from experts who 
are not active participants in the 
adversarial dispute before them. Sci-
entific organizations also should 
work with legal institutions to estab-
lish more formal feedback processes 
and enhance legal understanding of 
science. The Administrative Office of 
the U.S. Courts, the Federal Judicial 
Center, the National Center for State 
Courts, and the NationalJudicial Col-
lege all should be interested in devel-
oping such processes. 
Finally, increased funding of scien-
tific research also will help law use sci-
ence to find the truth. Neither law 
nor science is likely to discover the 
truth if scientific research is funded 
primarily by those who have a strong 
financial interest in a particular out-
come. Admittedly, government itself 
has an incentive in preserving long-
held government positions (such as 
those related to health effects of low-
dose radiation), but increased gov-
ernment funding is part of a means 
to ensure that science and law both 
have a better chance to do what we 
want them to do-help us discover 
the truth. iii 
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